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Abstract- This study tested the dual-component model of 
working memory (WM) against its unitary alternative. The 
former account predicts that WM consists of two functionally 
distinct mechanisms: a very accessible but capacity-limited 
primary memory (PM) and a less accessible secondary memory 
(SM). The latter account assumes only one long-term memory 
component. We used a novel version of the Sternberg serial 
recognition paradigm, which selectively impedes access to 
either early or late items, by asking participants about the 
location of a probe in relation to either the end or the start of 
encoded memory set, respectively. When locations matched 
probes, our manipulation harmed recognition of early items, 
while it left late items intact, in the case of both latency and 
accuracy. However, in trials in which locations did not match 
probes, such an effect regarded only latency but not accuracy. 
This result suggests that a way of access to WM may depend on 
the level of conflict among accessed memory items. Finally, 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) revealed two distinct 
sources of variance in recognition accuracy. In total, our 
results are consistent with the dual-component view of WM, 
and they implicate that early items were presumably held in 
SM, while late items benefited from being held in PM. 
Keywords- Working Memory; Primary Memory; Secondary 
Memory; Serial Recognition 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unitary theories of human memory propose that all 
effects (e.g., recency/primacy) found in working memory 
(WM) tasks, namely the tasks that require the active 
maintenance and transformation of a few chunks of 
information crucial for a current goal, reflect differences in 
some parameter value, like activation [1] or the strength of 
information coding [2], within one and only system of long-
term memory (LTM). These theories do not imply any 
dedicated short-term memory (STM) store.  
On the contrary, dual-component accounts of WM 
postulate that WM tasks involve both STM and LTM, and 
each memory has distinct functional properties. The former 
structure is often called [3] primary memory (PM), and is 
responsible for the active maintenance of a number of 
memory chunks, which due to that maintenance are directly 
accessible [4, 5, 6]. However, the capacity of PM is strictly 
limited, probably to as few as three or four memory items 
on average [7, 8]. The latter component, often called 
secondary memory (SM), reflects items outside of PM, 
which are passively stored, and which are less accessible 
because of the need to search SM using contextual cues and 
indirect retrievals. SM is much more capacious than PM, but 
it is prone to interference [9, 10] and/or decay [1]. 
Some studies supported the dual-component account of 
WM, showing that certain experimental manipulations did 
harm access to SM items, while access to PM items was left 
intact. In these studies, PM items were assumed to be a few 
recent items. SM items were either non-recent items or 
recent items which were somehow displaced from PM. For 
example, items supposedly maintained in PM were 
protected from proactive interference, while items residing 
in SM were not [11, 12, 13]. Moreover, a few words that were 
recalled immediately after their encoding were prone to 
phonological but not to semantic similarity, while the 
reverse was true for words recalled after several seconds of 
delay [14]. Also, recall from either PM or SM dissociated 
recency effects in many ways [8], and recall dynamics of the 
most recent item substantially differed from recall of earlier 
items [15]. Finally, latent variable modeling have shown that 
variables loaded by either PM or SM items from the same 
recall task shared little common variance [16].  
Although the research supporting the dual-component 
accounts succeeded to dissociate access to PM from SM, 
interpretation of its results is complicated by the fact that all 
those experiments involved either recall paradigms, which 
used a complex output procedure [8, 14, 16], or recognition 
tests in which experimental conditions presumed to capture 
SM versus PM differed to great extent [11, 12, 13, 15]. In recall 
tasks, the need to reproduce many items may make difficult 
the univocal identification of PM/SM items. For example, 
during a recall, some not-yet-recalled PM items may need to 
be transferred to SM. Also, a reproduction of substantial 
amount of information from SM can make participants use 
their PM in order to control a recall process, including that 
people may need to update the actively maintained temporal 
bindings linking each item to a tag informing whether that 
item has just been retrieved or it still awaits for retrieval. So, 
relatively complex formal models [8, 17] are often needed for 
a description of such an output procedure. On the other hand, 
so far, recognition tasks aimed at dissociating PM from SM, 
though required only one simple manual decision 
(accept/reject), and thus they seem to escape the problem of 
understanding what happens during output (also yielding 
relatively simpler mathematical models [15, 18, 19]), included 
substantially different conditions of access to SM than to 
PM. For instance, in Wickens et al.’s study [13], who used 
the well-known Sternberg task [20], in the SM condition a set 
of to-be-remembered items and a to-be-recognized probe 
were separated by a backward counting task lasting for 
twelve seconds, while in the PM condition the latter was 
presented almost immediately after the former. Halford et al. 
[12] used small set sizes to capture PM, while large set sizes 
involved SM. Conway and Engle [11] differentiated PM from 
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SM in the Sternberg task by either informing participants in 
advance (PM condition) or just before a probe (SM) about 
which pre-learned memory set should be searched for the 
probe. However, applying each of these manipulations 
constituted so substantial differences between PM and SM 
trials that observed dissociations might as well be attributed 
to other factors than the differences in access to WM (e.g., 
to the more pronounced involvement of executive control in 
more difficult conditions).  
In order to be able to more univocally interpret the 
selective experimental effects pertaining to SM, it would be 
optimal that the recognition procedure was the same no 
matter whether a probe matches PM or SM item. The 
present study applied such a procedure using a novel version 
of the Sternberg task, which required deciding whether a 
presented probe matched an item in a memory set on a 
particular location, as indicated by a digit co-presented with 
the probe. The crucial experimental manipulation consisted 
of asking the participants about the location of a probe in 
relation to either the start (a positive digit) or the end (a 
negative digit) of encoded memory set. The main goal of the 
study was to test if the results supporting the contribution of 
both PM and SM to the performance in the serial 
recognition task can also be obtained with the use of such a 
simpler and presumably better interpretable method, and 
whether a selective decrement in access to SM in 
comparison  to PM can be observed.  
Moreover, in all cited data obtained from recognition 
tasks, accuracy was at ceiling, and dissociations between 
SM and PM pertained only to latency of responses. If one 
assumes that SM is less available than PM, then the 
respective differences in accuracy of access to WM should 
also be observed. So, in the present study, both latency and 
accuracy were tested in an investigation of the differences in 
access to PM versus SM.  
In an analogy to the cited method of SM/PM 
identification in recall tasks [8, 16], here we also assumed that 
on most occasions only three recency items would be 
effectively maintained in PM due to its limited capacity, 
while the remaining three (prerecency) items would be 
transferred to SM. This assumption is supported by 
differences in accuracy between highly correct recognition 
of recent items and the decreased recognition of the 
remaining items, often observed in demanding versions of 
the Sternberg task [4, 15] and in other difficult recognition 
tests like the n-back task [21]. Such a strong recency effect 
seems to exclude a possibility that participants tend to fix a 
few early items to PM and then let other stimuli go, because 
in such a case the strong primacy instead of recency effect 
should be observed. Of course, such an association of PM to 
recency items is only probabilistic, and on some trials early 
items may indeed be kept in PM. 
II. GENERAL METHOD 
The task used in two reported experiments consisted of 
the serial presentation of six black letters (memory set, MS) 
shown on a white background, 4 × 6 cm in size, randomly 
drawn from a set of 18 consonants. A seventh letter was a 
probe, accompanied either by a digit or by a hash symbol, 
each around 2 × 3 cm in size and placed above the letter. 
The experimental factors regarded a probe position in 
MS (1 – 6) and a digit sign (“+” or “-“). Moreover, probes 
could match items in exact positions (congruent condition), 
they could match them in different positions (incongruent 
condition; the digit and the probe position differed by either 
one or two places), or they could be new items (digit-new). 
Instructions required deciding if the probe was displayed at 
the serial position indicated by a digit. Also, the standard 
version of the Sternberg task was tested, which included a 
hash symbol instead of a digit. Its two conditions, named 
no-digit or no-digit-new, for probes included in MS or not, 
respectively, required participants to accept/reject a probe if 
it was/wasn’t included in MS, no matter what was its real 
position. The no-digit condition served as a baseline. 
The crucial manipulation consisted of making the access 
to either PM or SM more difficult, by presenting either 
positive or negative digits, respectively (see Fig.1). The use 
of positive digits was expected to anchor the memory 
scanning at the first serial position and so yield more time 
and/or interference before getting from that reference 
position to the recent (i.e., PM) than to the early (i.e., SM) 
positions. Analogously, the use of negative digits should 
anchor the scanning at the last position (“-1”), and more 
time and/or interference was expected to be related to 
getting to the SM positions than to the PM ones. The crucial 
expectation, drawn from the assumptions of the dual-
component models, stated that, because of the more passive 
and prone nature of SM, access to SM items would be 
significantly more impacted by the negative digit condition 
(in comparison to the positive digit one) than access to PM 
items would be impacted by the positive digit condition (in 
comparison to the negative digit one). Such a prediction is 
not expected on grounds of unitary theories of WM.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Two sample trials of the modified Sternberg task  
Each sequence of events in a trial consisted of a presentation of six letters 
followed by a mask, and then a display of a target letter accompanied by a 
digit. On the left, the negative digit, congruent condition is shown. On the 
right, the positive digit, incongruent condition is shown. In the no-digit 
conditions, the digit was replaced by the hash symbol (#). 
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In fact, the adopted method seemed not to pertain to any 
specific nature of SM limitations. As argued, checking 
positions in relation to the end of a sequence (in comparison 
to its start) should be disruptive for retrievals from SM no 
matter if SM is limited by decay (as more time would be 
needed to access items located at larger distance from the 
reference position), interference (as probably there would be 
more processing steps to move further from the reference 
position), or discrepancy between context at study and at 
recognition (as the context would change more when 
moving further from the reference position). In the present 
paper, we make no particular commitments to the exact 
cause of SM’s lesser accessibility, which is a disputed issue 
in literature [1], [5], [8], [9], [10]. 
The digit-new and no-digit-new conditions were 
necessary only in order to balance participants’ biasing of 
accepting versus rejecting decisions. As our hypotheses did 
not pertain to these trials (positions did not apply), we only 
note that these conditions yielded close-to-ceiling effects 
(Ms > .90 and Ms > .86, in Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively), which indicate that participants had little 
problem with detecting the fact that items had not been 
presented to them. 
III. EXPERIMENT 1 
A. Participants 
A total of 86 students of the Jagiellonian University in 
Krakow participated. There were 55 women, the mean age 
was 21.8 years (SD = 3.05). Each participant was tested for 
one hour and received a course credit. 
B. Procedure 
Each trial consisted of a fixation point shown for 500 ms, 
followed by a sequence of six stimuli presented for 800 ms 
apiece, each masked for 200 ms. Then, another mask was 
shown for 500 ms, and followed by a probe along with 
either a digit or a hash sign. The participants were instructed 
to respond to the probe with the mouse by pressing its left 
button for an accept decision in case of targets, while using 
its right button for a reject decision in case of lures. The 
time allowed for response was 3 s. There were a total of 270 
fully randomized trials: 60 congruent, 60 incongruent, 60 
digit-new, 60 no-digit, and 30 no-digit-new trials. There 
were 47 subjects (the positive-digit group) to whom positive 
digits were presented in digit trials, and 39 (the negative-
digit group) who saw negative digits. The test was preceded 
by detailed instructions and twelve training trials including 
at least two trials from each condition. 
C. Data Screening and Analysis 
The mean response accuracy (i.e., the proportion of 
either correctly accepted targets or correctly rejected lures) 
and the mean latency of correct responses were dependent 
variables. Responses emitted in less than 250 ms were 
counted as errors. Response times larger than individual’s 
mean in a position × condition cell plus three median 
absolute deviations were trimmed to this criterion value 
(less than 2% of results). 
D. Results and Discussion 
First, we ran a 2 (digit sign) × 6 (item position) ANOVA 
in accuracy, in the congruent condition. The two-way 
interaction, presented in Fig. 2 (top panel), was significant, 
F(5, 420) = 4.09, p < .001, η2 = .06, and it indicated that the 
difference between the groups was significantly larger in the 
case of three early item positions then in the case of three 
late item positions, as shown by the respective contrast,  
F(1, 84) = 12.59, p < .001, η2 = .13. Accuracy at the former 
positions was significantly lower in the negative-digit group, 
F(1, 84) = 13.93, p < .001, while a respective difference 
regarding the latter positions was not significant, F = 0.17. 
Unfortunately, an analogous interaction was not significant 
in the incongruent condition (bottom panel in Fig. 2),  
F(5, 420) = 1.13, p = .334. Difference between the groups 
was insignificant in all serial positions (all ps > .15). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Mean response accuracy in the congruent-digit (top panel) and 
incongruent-digit (bottom panel) conditions of Experiment 1, for the 
positive- and negative-digit groups 
However, the effect was presented in the mean latency 
of correct responses (see Fig. 3), F(5, 420) = 5.18, p < .001,  
η2 = .06, and it indicated that in the case of three early items 
the difference in mean RT between the negative- and 
positive-digit conditions, F(1, 84) = 31.41, p < .001, 
 η2 = .27, was higher than the respective difference for three 
late items, F(1, 84) = 3.86, p = .023, η2 = .04. In the 
congruent condition such an interaction was also found,  
F(5, 420) = 12.61, p < .001, η2 = .13, showing higher RT 
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difference between the negative- and positive-digit 
conditions in the case of three early items, F(1, 84) = 18.98, 
p < .001, η2 = .18, than was the respective difference for 
three late items, which was not significant, F(1, 84) = 0.06. 
 
Fig. 3 Mean response latency in ms in the congruent-digit (top panel) and 
incongruent-digit (bottom panel) conditions of Experiment 1, for the 
positive- and negative-digit groups 
Both the latency and accuracy data in the congruent 
condition confirmed our hypothesis assuming that the 
manipulation with a digit sign would harm only access to 
three early items (associated with SM), while it would leave 
recent items (associated with PM) intact. However, the same 
manipulation was not effective in the incongruent condition, 
because it only influenced time to respond to SM items, but 
not the accuracy of responding. 
Using a between-subjects design yielded in fact two 
slightly different experimental procedures for both groups. 
So, a within-subjects design was used in the next 
experiment in order to verify data obtained so far with a 
more homogenous procedure and with more observations in 
each condition. Additionally, with such a design, we were 
able to correlate the PM and SM indices from the WM task, 
which was this time the same for all participants. 
IV. EXPERIMENT 2 
A. Participants 
A total of 97 students of various colleges in Krakow 
participated. There were 61 women, the mean age was 22.6 
years old (SD = 4.72). Each participant was tested for three 
hours and received an equivalent of four EUR. 
B. Procedure 
The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, 
with only two changes in the experimental design, which 
regarded within-subjects manipulation with positive and 
negative digits, and the pattern of trials. There were 384 
trials in total: 48 congruent-positive, 48 congruent-negative, 
48 incongruent-positive, 48 incongruent-negative, 24 
positive-digit-new, 24 negative-digit-new, 96 no-digit, and 
48 no-digit-new trials. Subjects practiced three conditions 
(i.e., positive, negative, and no-digit ones) separately (in 
random order), and then trained all of them together. 
C. Data Screening and Analysis 
We tested an analogous two-way interaction of factors 
as in Experiment 1. Data screening was also identical to that 
in Experiment 1. Additionally, we excluded data from the 
no-digit condition of four participants who scored less than 
25% in that condition (they probably failed to learn what the 
hash symbol indicated).  
For confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the accuracy 
of memory recognition, we used the decision-bias-corrected 
indices of performance, that is, differences between hit rates 
in the congruent-digit condition and false alarm rates in the 
incongruent condition [22]. We did not model latency data, 
because of the huge individual differences in mental and 
motor speed observed among participants (i.e., such a model 
would mostly reflect speed factor beyond the WM domain). 
The two alternative, unitary versus dual-component, models 
were calculated with Statistica software (ver. 9) using the 
maximum-likelihood estimation. We evaluated the goodness 
of fit of those models with standard indices: chi-square 
value divided by the number of degrees of freedom (χ2/df), 
Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean 
square of approximation (RMSEA). 
D. Results 
In case of accuracy data in the congruent condition, 
presented in Fig. 4 (top panel), the examined interaction was 
significant, F(5, 480) = 9.64, p < .001, η2 = .09. As in 
Experiment 1, it reflected the fact that a difference between 
the positive and negative conditions was significantly larger 
in the case of three early item positions then in the case of 
three late item positions, as shown by the respective contrast, 
F(1, 96) = 39.74, p < .001, η2 = .29. This time, not only 
accuracy for three early items significantly differed between 
positive- and negative-digit trials, F(1, 96) = 162.00,  
p < .001, but also did accuracy for three late positions,  
F(1, 96) = 18.98, p < .001. 
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Fig. 4 Mean response accuracy in the congruent-digit (top panel) and 
incongruent-digit (bottom panel) conditions of Experiment 2, for the 
positive- and negative-digit conditions 
Although in the incongruent condition (accuracy data are 
presented in bottom panel of Fig. 4) the two-way interaction 
was significant, F(5, 480) = 3.71, p = .003, η2 = .04, it 
yielded an insignificant contrast between the positive and 
negative conditions regarding the three early versus three 
late positions, F = 0.01, and it indicated no respective 
difference for the later nor for the former, both Fs < 0.38.  
As in Experiment 1, the effect in the incongruent 
condition was present in the mean RT (see Fig. 5),  
F(5, 440) = 6.34, p < .001, η2 = .07. It indicated that 
responses to four early items were slower in the negative 
than in the positive condition, F(1, 93) = 41.78, p < .001, 
while no such difference occurred in the case of two late 
items, F(1, 93) = 1.98, p = .163. A similar effect on RT was 
found between three early and three late items in the 
congruent condition, F(5, 440) = 14.54, p < .001, η2 = .15, 
showing the higher RT difference between the negative- and 
positive-digit conditions in the case of three early items,  
F(1, 93) = 238.53, p < .001, η2 = .73, than was the 
respective difference for three late items, F(1, 93) = 87.55, 
 p < .001, η2 = .49. 
 
Fig. 5 Mean response latency in ms in the congruent-digit (top panel) and 
incongruent-digit (bottom panel) conditions of Experiment 2, for the 
positive- and negative-digit conditions 
Finally, we tested the CFA dual-component model by 
estimating the correlation between the latent variables 
representing SM and PM, the former loaded by the bias-
corrected indices for Positions 1 – 4, and the latter loaded by 
the corresponding indices for Positions 3 – 6. The overlap 
between variables in the Positions 3 and 4 reflected 
commonly observed individual differences in PM capacity. 
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities of manifest 
variables used in CFA, as well as the matrix of correlations 
between them, are presented in Table 1. The data show that 
all variables nicely approximated the normal distribution 
and had acceptable reliability. 
TABLE I STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX FOR BIAS-CORRECTED INDICES OF WORKING MEMORY USED IN CFA (N = 97)  
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1.   Position 1 –      
2.   Position 2 .74 –     
3.   Position 3 .58 .61 –    
4.   Position 4 .64 .56 .64 –   
5.   Position 5 .48 .50 .65 .68 –  
6.   Position 6 .41 .33 .51 .49 .68 – 
Mean .46 .29 .37 .47 .41 .55 
SD .32 .31 .27 .28 .33 .30 
Range -.25 -.31 -.31 -.25 -.31 -.19 
– 1.0 – 1.0 – .81 – .94 – 1.0 – 1.0 
Skew -.32 .13 -.38 -.21 -.20 -.78 
Kurtosis -.71 -.61 -.70 .66 -.64 -.12 
Reliability .80 .62 .60 .72 .75 .80 
All correlations were significant on at least p = .004 level. Reliabilities are split-half correlations adjusted with the Spearman-Brown formula. 
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The initial model had an excellent fit, df = 6, χ2/df = 1.18, 
RMSEA = .019, CFI = .997, but the correlation between the 
SM and PM variables was significant (r = .65; p < .001), 
though it also significantly differed from unity, t(95) = 4.43, 
p < .001, which is the r value predicted by the unitary model. 
An alternative CFA model, including all six positions 
loading onto one latent WM variable, was not acceptable,  
df = 9, χ2/df = 5.19, RMSEA = .211, CFI = .890. The 
significant correlation between SM and PM might result 
from using incongruent condition data (reflected in the bias-
corrected index). When accuracy from the sole congruent 
condition was used in the final dual-component model,  
df = 6, χ2/df = 0.92, RMSEA = .0, CFI = 1.0, such a 
correlation was much weaker, r = .26, and only marginally 
significant, t(95) = 1.87, p = .061 (see the model in Fig. 6), 
matching the result obtained by Unsworth et al. (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 The CFA model relating the primary memory and secondary 
memory latent variables 
Boxes represent manifest variables, “Position 1” to “Position 6” 
represent bias-corrected indices of accuracy in serial positions of 
Experiment 2. Large ovals represent latent variables. Values between ovals 
and boxes represent relevant standardized factor loadings (all ps < .001). 
The value between ovals represents a path coefficient among latent 
variables (p < .001), while the values in brackets indicate its 95% 
confidence intervals. 
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
An expected dissociation between non-recency and 
recency items in the congruent condition of our task was 
found in both experiments, in case of both latency and 
accuracy data. Changing a digit’s sign into the negative one 
presumably made access to non-recent items more difficult, 
and it substantially decreased accuracy of their recognition, 
while no such effect was present for the most recent items.  
However, in the incongruent condition, only latency was 
affected by our manipulation, while accuracy was not. This 
result is surprising, as the way of encoding the memory 
traces had to be the same in both congruency conditions (i.e., 
participants did not know in advance whether the current 
trial was either congruent or incongruent). Assuming that 
the effect of a digit’s sign did uncover the dual-component 
nature of WM, as suggested by the differences in latency in 
both conditions as well as by the accuracy difference in the 
congruent condition, we considered two explanations of the 
fact that the accuracy effect did not show up in the 
incongruent condition. Firstly, participants could respond 
with a very conservative bias – in uncertain cases they were 
choosing to reject the probes than to accept them. As the 
early positions in the negative-digit trials imposed larger 
difficulty on participants than in the positive-digit trials, and 
thus there could be a larger number of guesses in the former 
trials, only the congruent condition was harmed, because in 
the incongruent condition the right answers (i.e., reject) 
were often guessed. However, this hypothesis seems 
unlikely, as the mean index of bias (i.e., the proportion of 
incorrect accept decisions to all errors) was moderate (e.g., 
β = .54 in Exp. 2), suggesting that both accept and reject 
answers were guessed with comparable probability.  
A more plausible explanation pertains to differences 
related to access to WM. Participants, in order to search 
WM, could use in parallel both the probe and the serial 
position indicated by a digit, and might simultaneously 
check a position of that probe and an item occupying that 
position [23]. The access might depend on how many 
memory traces getting activated during such a check. 
Specifically, in the congruent condition, both ways led to 
activation of the same trace, so no conflict was incurred. 
The more available was that trace (in terms of differences 
between SM and PM), the better it was accessed. So, the 
differences in availability of items were reflected in the 
differences in accuracy between SM and PM. Such a 
straightforward nature of WM access in congruent trials is 
suggested by accuracy in those trials comparable to the 
baseline condition, M = .77 and M = .79, respectively.  
However, in incongruent trials, the access to WM might 
not rely on a one-step process. The conflict between initially 
activated versus perceived probes/positions might not yield 
immediate reject decisions, but might yield an additional 
process of careful recollection of complete memory traces 
for both the probe and the indicated position (i.e., so-called 
recall-to-reject process [18, 24]). If the respective traces had 
been encoded in SM, then this additional process could 
successfully retrieve them in both the positive and negative 
digit conditions, so no differences in accuracy for SM items 
might be observed. However, the effective retrieval of less 
accessible SM traces in the negative condition would take 
longer. So, the way of access to WM would depend on the 
amount of conflict among memory items. A greater need for 
using the recall-to-reject process in the positive-incongruent 
condition can be deduced from the substantially lower 
overall accuracy in that condition (M = .69) than in the 
baseline condition (M = .79). Its occurrence is also 
suggested by approx. 180 ms longer overall latency of 
correct rejections in comparison to correct accept decisions. 
Could the unitary account explain the observed data? 
For instance, our manipulation might affect only weak 
memory traces of non-recent items, while strong traces of 
recent items could be more robust to changes in the position 
estimation procedure. Also, responses to weak traces could 
be influenced by decisional biases to greater extent than 
responses to strong traces. However, such explanations 
seem less plausible than the dual-component explanation.  
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Firstly, any supposedly weaker memory traces of non-
recent items should have resulted in significantly worse 
performance for these items, regardless of a task condition. 
On the contrary, in the congruent condition, the accuracy for 
non-recent and recent items was comparable. Secondly, any 
unitary explanation, assuming that a single mechanism was 
responsible for scores on all item positions, is problematic 
when facing two distinct sources of variance revealed by our 
CFA model. Latent variable analysis indicated that variance 
in the bias-corrected indices of discriminability, calculated 
for recent and non-recent items, were shared only to 
moderate extent (i.e., 42.3% of variance was shared; 6.7% 
when only hit rates were taken into account).  
Summing up, the experimental effects showing the 
selective sensitivity of accuracy (in congruent trials) and 
latency (in both congruent and incongruent trials) of WM 
access, together with the CFA results, seem to be very 
consistent with the dual-component account of WM, while 
they are problematic for the unitary alternative. The present 
study has demonstrated that even the simple manipulation 
done to the recognition task, which involved minimal 
changes between experimental conditions, can lead to 
selective impediment of access to items associated with SM, 
but not – with PM. The main contribution of this research is 
related to the fact that it helps to reject an interpretation, 
which was not univocally eliminated by the previous studies, 
saying that dissociations between SM and PM performance 
might have arisen due to factors other than SM/PM 
differences, for instance factors related to the complexity of 
recall or substantial differences in the recognition procedure. 
On the contrary, our novel version of the Sternberg task 
showed that these dissociations can easily be found also in a 
relatively simpler recognition paradigm, and as such, they 
further support the dual-component theory of WM. 
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